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THE BATTLE OVER CLASS ACTION: SECOND CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT 
CLASS ACTION WAIVER FOR ANTITRUST ACTIONS UNENFORCEABLE 
UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
 
Dustin Morgan* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In In re American Express Merchants Litigation, the Second Circuit held that the class 
action waiver clause within the arbitration agreement between American Express and 
corporations found in both New York and California made the agreement unenforceable because 
recourse to class action was essential to protecting the corporations’ statutory rights under the 
federal antitrust statues.1 The court also decided that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-
Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the court, not the arbitrator, continued to be 
responsible for determining the validity of a class action waiver in an agreement to arbitrate.2 The 
court reasoned that the class action waiver in the arbitration agreement would disincentivize 
plaintiffs from bringing individual suit under the federal antitrust statutes because of the high 
costs associated with antitrust litigation and the marginal recovery that each individual plaintiff 
would receive if successful.3 Because the court viewed the private enforcement of the antitrust 
laws as essential to the underlying congressional intent, any attempt to limit this intent would go 
against public policy, and would be void as such.4 By disincentivizing private enforcement, the 
class action waiver in the arbitration provision prevented plaintiffs from enforcing their rights 
under federal antitrust statutes, voiding the agreement as against public policy.5 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The named Plaintiffs in this litigation, California and New York corporations that operate 
businesses who have accounts with American Express and the National Supermarkets 
Association, Inc. (“Plaintiffs”), “a voluntary membership-based trade association that represents 
the interests of independently owned supermarkets,”6 sought to represent a class of litigants 
against American Express, challenging the terms and conditions they were forced to accept by 
opening a charge account with the Defendant financing company as a violation of the federal 
antitrust statutes.7 The class the Plaintiffs sought to certify was defined as: “[A]ll merchants that 
have accepted American Express charge cards (including the American Express corporate card), 
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and have thus been forced to agree to accept American Express credit and debit cards, during the 
longest period of time permitted by the applicable statute of limitations . . . throughout the United 
States . . ..”8  
In order to receive a charge or debit card from American Express, the parties had to agree 
to a standard form agreement supplied by American Express.9 Impliedly, the plaintiffs agreed to 
these terms by opening an account with American Express. The standard form contract contained 
provisions allowing either party to terminate the agreement and reserving with American Express 
the right to change the agreement upon written notice to the contracting parties.10 The contracting 
parties were advised of their right to terminate the agreement within the provision allowing for 
modification of the standard form.11 In 1999, American Express exercised its right of 
modification and inserted an arbitration agreement which stated: 
For the purpose of this Agreement, Claim means any assertion of a 
right, dispute or controversy between you and us arising from or 
relating to this Agreement and/or the relationship resulting from this 
Agreement. Claim includes claims of every kind and nature including, 
but not limited to, initial claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-
party claims and claims based upon contract, tort, intentional tort, 
statutes, regulations, common law and equity. We shall not elect to use 
arbitration under this arbitration provision for any individual Claim that 
you properly file and pursue in a small claims court of your state or 
municipality so long as the Claim is pending only in that court.12 
The arbitration agreement also contained the following provision which forbade both 
American Express and the contracting parties from participating, either in a representative or 
participatory fashion, in class action lawsuits.13 The provision specifically stated: 
IF ARBITRATION IS CHOSEN BY ANY PARTY WITH RESPECT 
TO A CLAIM, NEITHER YOU NOR WE WILL HAVE THE RIGHT 
TO LITIGATE THAT CLAIM IN COURT OR HAVE A JURY 
TRIAL ON THAT CLAIM . . . FURTHER, YOU WILL NOT HAVE 
THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN A REPRESENTATIVE 
CAPACITY OR AS A MEMBER OF ANY CLASS OF CLAIMANTS 
PERTAINING TO ANY CLAIM SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION. 
THE ARBITRATOR'S DECISION WILL BE FINAL AND 
BINDING. NOTE THAT OTHER RIGHTS THAT YOU WOULD 
HAVE IF YOU WENT TO COURT MAY ALSO NOT BE 
AVAILABLE IN ARBITRATION.14 
In the district court proceeding, American Express moved to compel arbitration pursuant 
to the standard for agreement signed by the Plaintiffs.15 The district court granted American 
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Express’ motion.16 In so doing, the district court held that “the agreement was ‘a paradigmatically 
broad clause’ which was certainly applicable to the dispute between the parties.”17 The district 
court, justifying its ultimate conclusion, also held that “[t]he enforceability of the of the collective 
action waivers is a claim for the arbitrator to resolve. Issues relating to the enforceability of the 
contract and its specific provisions are for the arbitrator, once arbitrability has been 
established.”18 Given these findings, the district court decided that the Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims 
and the enforceability of the class action waiver were to be settled in arbitration; the district court 
dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claims.19 
The Second Circuit received the case for the first time after the Plaintiffs filed an 
appeal.20 The court decided that the validity of the class action waiver was a question for the 
court, and not the arbitrator, to decide.21 The court reasoned that Green Tree Financial Corp. v. 
Randolph controlled their analysis regarding the enforceability of the class action waiver.22 The 
Supreme Court in Green Tree found that “where . . . a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration 
agreement on the grounds that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the 
burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.”23 Applying this principle, the Second 
Circuit found that the district court erred in ruling the Plaintiffs failed to carry this burden because 
they “ignore[d] the statutory protections provided by the Clayton Act.”24 The Second Circuit 
found that the record supported a finding that the Plaintiffs would incur prohibitive costs if they 
were compelled to arbitrate under the agreement.25 Given these findings, the court held that the 
class action waiver invalidated the arbitration agreement.26 Their decision was grounded in 
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), allowing for non-enforcement of arbitration 
agreements where a ground for invalidation of a contract exists at common law; since the court 
believed such a ground existed here, non-enforcement was proper.27 American Express filed a 
petition for certiorari, which was granted by the Supreme Court.28 The Supreme Court granted the 
petition, vacated the Second Circuit’s decision, and remanded the decision for proceedings 
consistent with its recent decision in Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.29 
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III.  COURT’S ANALYSIS 
A. The Effects of Stolt-Nielsen on the Class Action Waiver 
The Second Circuit first discussed the effects that Stolt-Nielsen had on the case, as was 
required by the Supreme Court when it remanded the case. The court concluded that the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Stolt-Nielsen was that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit 
to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do 
so.”30 American Express urged that the Supreme Court’s decision required the court to “faithfully 
enforce the parties’ arbitration agreement.”31 The Second Circuit distinguished the question here 
as one of whether a class action waiver is enforceable when it would “effectively strip the 
plaintiffs of their ability to prosecute alleged antitrust violations.”32 As such, the question was not 
one of giving intent to the parties’ agreements; instead, the Second Circuit viewed the issue as 
whether Section 2 of the FAA allowed for non-enforcement through common law contract 
grounds.33 In doing so, the court would examine the enforceability of class action waivers under 
the federal substantive arbitration law.34 
The court’s analysis of the federal arbitration law governing this issue was influenced by 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.35 In Gilmer, the 
Supreme Court held that “‘[i]t is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an 
arbitration agreement,’” the arbitration clause was enforceable “‘unless Congress itself has 
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights  at issue.’”36 
The Second Circuit, referencing Gilmer, framed the relevant inquiry as “whether the mandatory 
class action waiver in the Card Acceptance Agreement is enforceable even if the plaintiffs are 
able to demonstrate that the practical effect of enforcement of the waiver would be to preclude 
their bringing Sherman Act claims against Amex in either an individual or collective capacity.”37  
The court also examined the Supreme Court’s decision in Green Tree Financial Corp.-
Alabama v. Randolph in framing its analysis.38 In Green Tree the Supreme Court held that “when 
'a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be 
prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such 
costs.’”39 This decision, along with the one articulated by the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., holding that “public policy concerns might bar an 
agreement to arbitrate,”40 would allow for the Second Circuit to invalidate the agreement to 
arbitrate if the class action waiver would force parties to participate in an arbitral procedure that 
was prohibitive expensive or would violate public policy.41  
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B. The Court’s Analysis of the Particular Agreement Between American Express 
and the Plaintiffs 
The Second Circuit began its analysis of the validity of American Express’ arbitration 
clause by noting “an agreement which in practice acts as a waiver of future liability under the 
federal antitrust statutes is void as a matter of public policy.”42 The second of the factors 
articulated by the Second Circuit was met; the class action waiver was in violation of public 
policy. The court next turned to the issue of whether the arbitration agreement would inflict 
prohibitive costs upon the Plaintiffs, effectively robbing them of their ability to protect their 
rights under the federal antitrust statutes.43  
The court here found that there was ample evidence in the record to support a finding that 
arbitrating their disputes would effectively act as a bar to the Plaintiffs asserting their statutory 
rights under the federal antitrust statutes.44 The court based their assertion on expert testimony 
submitted by the Plaintiffs at the district court level.45 The Plaintiffs’ expert asserted that the 
Plaintiffs expected awards would be notably less than the expected costs they would incur if 
forced to individually arbitrate their antitrust claims.46 The court viewed the expert’s testimony as 
demonstrative that “the only economically feasible means for enforcing their [the Plaintiffs’] 
statutory rights is via class action.”47 Even with the trebling of damages and the shifting of 
attorney’s fees, which must include an assessment of likelihood on the merits, the Plaintiffs 
would not be able to recover more than the costs associated with the experts and would be 
discouraged from bringing suit.48 
The court concluded that the private enforcement of the antitrust statutes was essential to 
protecting the statutory rights protected by the antitrust statutes.49 Strong private incentives were 
included within the statutes to encourage private enforcement; the prohibitive costs associated 
with individual arbitration cut inapposite to these incentives and could not stand when taking into 
account this congressional intent.50 Because the class action waiver was found to be both in 
violation of public policy and a strong congressional intent favoring private enforcement, the 
class action waiver provision was ruled to be void.51 The court refused to articulate a per se rule 
forbidding the inclusion of a class action in an agreement to arbitrate; instead the ruling court 
must rule on the enforceability of the waiver on a case-by-case basis, considering the merits.52 
Finally, the court did not view the Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen as prohibiting this 
result; it noted that this decision merely prevented the court from ordering class-wide 
arbitration.53 Because the court did not do this, it was clearly within the scope of its powers in 
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making its ruling. The court remanded the decision to the district court for proceedings consistent 
with their decision here.54 
C. The Court’s Analysis in Light of AT&T Mobility – Amex  III 
The Supreme Court severely called the Second Circuits analysis when it rendered its 
decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.55 The Second Circuit addressed this concern in 
the third iteration of In re American Express Merchants Litigation (“Amex III”).56 The court 
found that neither AT&T Mobility, nor Stolt-Nielsen affected its previous analysis.57 It argued that 
neither decision addressed the narrow issue presented by the Plaintiffs: “whether a class-action 
arbitration waiver clause is enforceable even if the plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that the 
practical effect of enforcement would be to preclude their ability to vindicate their federal 
statutory rights.”58 The court reasoned that class action lawsuits are an effective mechanism for 
the vindication of statutory rights.59 Arbitration can also provide an effective mechanism for 
litigants to litigate their rights, but this vindication can only come where the agreement to 
arbitrate does not act as a de facto waiver of the statutory right; the litigant must be able to 
effectively protect their rights in the arbitral forum.60 The court found that the Plaintiffs had 
proven that arbitrating their antitrust claims would be prohibitively expensive and effectively 
prevent them from vindicating their rights under the federal antitrust statutes.61 The court relied 
heavily on expert testimony opining that seeking individual lawsuits would lead to a negative 
value outcome; this testimony was seen as essential proof that any individual suit would be 
prohibitively expensive.62 The court continued to warn that they were not expressing the opinion 
that class action waivers are per se unenforceable, instead the court ruled that “each waiver must 
be considered on its own merits, based on its own record, and governed with a healthy regard for 
the fact that the FAA ‘is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements.’"63 The Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instructions to 
deny the Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration under the FAA.64 
                                                     
54 Id. 
55 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (holding that California’s Discover 
Bank rule invalidating arbitral clauses containing class action waivers as unconscionable is incompatible with the FAA 
and therefore preempted). 
56 See In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Amex III”). 
57 Id. at 212. 
58 Id.; see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (holding that California’s 
Discover Bank rule invalidating arbitral clauses containing class action waivers as unconscionable is incompatible with 
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64 Id. at 219–20. 
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IV.  SIGNIFICANCE 
In re American Express Merchants Litigation is one of the rare cases that significantly 
impacts numerous aspects of arbitration law. The Second Circuit’s decision not only affects the 
status of class action waiver clauses within arbitral agreements, it also touches on arbitrator 
autonomy and the arbitrability of antitrust suits. Each of these issues have arguably been settled 
by the Supreme Court, but the Second Circuit’s decision here strongly calls into question this 
assertion. While the Second Circuit agrees with the Supreme Court regarding arbitrator 
autonomy, its ruling regarding the arbitrability of antitrust suits is seemingly in direct opposition 
with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.65 
The court’s ultimate holding, that the class action waiver included by American Express voids the 
agreement to arbitrate, is also now called into question by the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.66 All three of these issues present interesting questions concerning 
the continued validity of the Second Circuit’s decision in In re American Express Merchants 
Litigation, and how courts in this jurisdiction, and maybe even the Supreme Court, resolve these 
questions will determine the ultimate impact of the Second Circuit’s decision here. 
The Supreme Court effectively limited arbitrator autonomy in Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. 
AnimalFeeds International Corp. Here, the Supreme Court held that the question of whether class 
arbitration was appropriate was a question for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide.67 By 
overruling the arbitrator’s decision, the Court implicitly reserved the right to determine the nature 
of class action provisions within an arbitral agreement.68 In re American Express Merchants 
Litigation reinforces this idea. In fact, both parties in the litigation agreed that this matter was a 
non-issue; neither party challenged the Second Circuit’s assertion that they were the proper body 
to determine the enforceability of the class action waiver in light of Stolt-Nielsen.69 This decision 
is the least contentious matter decided by the Second Circuit, but it is nonetheless significant. It 
signals that this jurisdiction has effectively moved with the Supreme Court from a regime that 
recognizes a high degree of arbitrator autonomy, evidenced in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. 
Bazzle, to one that restricts the arbitrator autonomy, at least within the context of decided 
questions regarding class action, as advanced in Stolt-Nielsen.70 It now falls squarely within the 
authority of the court to decide issues regarding class action within the arbitration context; the 
Second Circuit directly recognizes this proposition here. 
The Second Circuit advances several policy justifications for holding the class action 
waiver clause unenforceable; among these the court reasons that the class action waiver provision 
places a burden upon individual litigants preventing the kind of private enforcement envisioned in 
                                                     
65 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635-37 (reasoning that 
international arbitration provides an effective mechanism through which American antitrust statutes can be enforced). 
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68 See id. at 1774-76 (citing Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)) (“It falls to courts and 
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69 In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 191 (2d Cir. 2011), aff’d on reconsideration by In re Am. 
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70 Compare Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452-453 (2003) (holding whether parties agreed to 
class arbitration was a question of contract interpretation properly settled by the arbitrator), with Stolt-Nielsen 130 S. 
Ct. at 174 (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 479). 
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and fundamental to the antitrust statutes.71 These findings seem to call into question the 
arbitrability of antitrust claims, an issue that was effectively decided by the Supreme Court in 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.72 The Second Circuit here employs 
reasoning that has been explicitly forbidden by the Supreme Court; questions of antitrust 
arbitrability have been settled, and the controversies are to be sent to arbitration where the parties 
have agreed as such. Even though the court cites Mitsubishi to show agreement with their 
ultimate conclusions, it seems to misunderstand the proper application of the precedent; it must 
be viewed in terms of its ultimate conclusion that antitrust suits are, at their core, arbitrable. The 
divergence from Supreme Court precedent severely calls into question any long-term impact that 
this decision will have, making any significant impact, at the very least, questionable. 
Finally, the Second Circuit’s decision to invalidate the class action waiver presents 
interesting questions in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion. In AT&T Mobility the Supreme Court decided that states may not enact class action 
waiver laws that stand as an obstacle to the enforcement of arbitration agreements governed by 
the FAA.73 This pronouncement is arguably applicable to the federal courts. The Supreme Court, 
in AT&T Mobility, made broad statements in the decision, describing class action waivers as 
interfering with the FAA’s mandate requiring arbitration where an underlying agreement is 
found.74 This broad language hints that application will be applied broadly and call into focus all 
federal decisions concerning agreements to arbitrate; class action waivers will likely be viewed as 
part of the underlying agreement to submit disputes to arbitration. If this analysis holds true, the 
Second Circuit’s decision here will likely be viewed as directly conflicting with Supreme Court 
precedent. The Second Circuit’s decision here seems to be inapposite to the “liberal policy 
favoring arbitration” described by the Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility.75 Because of this the 
Second Circuit’s holding’s continued significance and validity is significantly called into 
question. The court’s best hope lies in its decision to not adopt a per se rule prohibiting class 
action waivers, instead adopting a case-by-case analysis.76 Whether this decision will ultimately 
stand will depend on the course this litigation takes after remand. It is legitimate to wonder 
whether the Second Circuit will stand by its decision if given the chance to reverse in light of 
AT&T Mobility, or if the court will decide that it was correct and give the Supreme Court another 
                                                     
71 Am. Express, 634 F.3d at 199; see also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) (“In enacting 
these laws [the antitrust statutes], Congress had many means at its disposal to penalize violators. It could have, for 
example, required violators to compensate federal, state, and local governments for the estimated damage to their 
respective economies caused by the violations. But, this remedy was not selected. Instead, Congress chose to permit all 
persons to sue to recover three times their actual damages every time they were injured in their business or property by 
an antitrust violation. By offering potential litigants the prospect of a recovery in three times the amount of their 
damages, Congress encouraged these persons to serve as private attorneys general.”). This notion of the private 
attorney general seems to be central to the Second Circuit’s argument. A strong argument can be made that this line of 
decisions will likely stand because of the unique nature of the antitrust statutes and accompanying litigation. 
72 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 636-37 (1985) (“Where the parties 
have agreed that the arbitral body is to decide a defined set of claims which includes, as in these cases, those arising 
from the application of American antitrust law, the tribunal therefore should be bound to decide that dispute in accord 
with the national law giving rise to the claim.”). 
73 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
74 Id. at 1750. 
75 Id. at 1745. 
76 Am. Express, 634 F.3d at 199.  
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chance to rule on the applicability of class action waivers in arbitral clauses.77 This decision will 
determine the ultimate significance of In re American Express Merchants Litigation. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit’s decision in In re American Express Merchants Litigation can be 
viewed in one of two ways: either as an attempt to expand protection to consumers trying to avoid 
recourse to arbitration, or as a direct challenge to the Supreme Court’s authority to shape 
arbitration law in the United States. Either way, the decision is unlikely to stand given the recent 
decision in AT&T Mobility. Here, the Supreme Court rejected the courts’ role as protector of 
consumer rights. The Court stated “the times in which consumer contracts were anything other 
than adhesive are long past.”78 This pronouncement is an implicit pronouncement that should no 
longer serve as consumer protection agencies. The realities facing the consumer market dictate 
that businesses deal in terms of adhesion. Consumers must face this reality and not look to courts 
to invalidate deals they accepted as part of doing business. 
The Supreme Court also showed a willingness in AT&T Mobility to overrule the circuit 
courts on issues it feels were decided wrongly. AT&T Mobility was decided on appeal from the 
Ninth Circuit; the Supreme Court showed no hesitation to overrule the Ninth Circuit when they 
felt the circuit decided the class action waiver issue wrongly.79 If the Second Circuit is 
challenging the Supreme Court in holding the class action waiver enforceable, it should expect its 
decision to be overruled. If the Second Circuit gets a second chance to rule on the issue after 
remand to the district court it should rule in accordance with Supreme Court precedent and 
declare the class action waiver enforceable if it wants its decision to stand. This conflict, and the 
discrepancy between the Second Circuit’s reasoning regarding the inarbitrability and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Mitsubishi, will need to be remedied before In re American Express 
Merchants Litigation can have any lasting effect. Inconsistency and failure to abide by precedent 
will only frustrate the development of arbitration law by necessitating needless appeal and 
clouding issues that once considered to be clear.  
                                                     
77 This continues to be a question after Amex III. It is unclear whether the case-by-case basis test will continue to 
stand, or whether a doctrine will be developed that is more in line with the Supreme Court’s strong presumption of 
favoring the recourse to individual arbitration. Amex III and its predecessors are unique because they involve a question 
of antitrust litigation; an area of law where individual litigants are unlikely to proceed with nominal claims without 
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vindicates statutory rights—especially if the issues arises in another area of substantive law. 
78 AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1750. 
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